Horrifying news out of Pyongyang today: scarlet fever is spreading and threatening to tear that country apart. North Korea, as should become more widely known (forward this article to all your friends, and tell them that Greg Pratt sent you!), has little capability to deal with medical issues and most of the people are starving. It’s a terrible thing that their leadership would do what it has done to the Korean public.
Over at Slate today is a Fred Kaplan article on the new Defense Secretary and Iraq. Before I share a few thoughts, I’ll excerpt a little here and there.
Bartlett’s remark is reminiscent of—and, perhaps unwittingly, confirms—the comment that a Bush “senior adviser” made to journalist Ron Suskind two years ago that the days of the “reality-based community” were over. “We’re an empire now,” this ill-educated adviser boasted, “and when we act, we create our own reality.” This has been the problem all along—a willful neglect, even defiance, of reality. To be a visionary is one thing; to have visions is another.
After discussing the role Clark Clifford played in the de-escalation of the Vietnam War, Kaplan writes (still on Clifford):
When a reporter asked if he was a hawk or a dove, he replied, “I am not conscious of falling under any of those ornithological distinctions.” But Johnson wanted peace talks, as did the Democratic establishment. So, Clifford ordered a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, set a limit on the number of U.S. troops sent there, and told the South Vietnamese they’d have to assume a greater share of the burden. (Richard Nixon reversed this course and escalated the bombing after he became president in 1969. But if Nixon hadn’t won the election, Clifford might now be known as the man who laid the path toward a much earlier end to the war.)
It’s not quite clear what George W. Bush wants Robert Gates to do. But it’s doubtful Gates would have come back to Washington, from his pleasant perch as president of Texas A&M, if the job description read “staying the course on Iraq.” Just what steps he’ll take on Iraq will become clearer when James Baker’s commission releases its recommendations. Since Gates was an active member of the panel, it is widely assumed that the report will become the new policy. Whether that assumption is right, and whatever the report ends up saying, here are some practical steps that Gates can take immediately upon entering office:
Start to redeploy U.S. troops inside Iraq, with an eye toward withdrawing one-half to two-thirds of them by the end of next year. Victory, in the sense that Bush defined it at the outset, is no longer possible. A consensus seems to be forming around a less ambitious, more realistic mission. Senior military officers are openly stressing the goal of a self-sustaining Iraqi government, not a democratic one. Proposals are circulating for U.S. forces to assume a much lower profile—retreating to their massive “forward operating bases,” abandoning street patrols and counterinsurgency efforts (for which we don’t have enough troops in any case), and focusing instead on logistics, air support, intelligence, border security, and the training of the Iraqi army. These tasks can be sustained with around 30,000 troops. An additional 10,000 troops or so could be sent out with Iraqi units as embedded advisers. Fort Riley, Kan., home of the Army’s 1st Infantry Division, has started to train midlevel officers to be such advisers at the rate of 2,000 a month.
Increase the size of the U.S. Army by about 80,000 combat personnel. Many Democratic and Republican lawmakers favor this move. The ground forces are exhausted from their frequent combat rotations. The National Guard and Reserves have been misused as the instruments of a backdoor draft. There is not a single serious military analyst who doesn’t think the U.S. Army is too small. Well, actually, there is one—Donald Rumsfeld. Kick some gumption into the active-duty officer corps. It is pathetic to see so many three- and four-star generals reduced to quivering yes-men by the dismissive vindictiveness of the sitting secretary of defense. Their kowtowing may be motivated by respect for civilian authority, but obeying lawful orders is different from abrogating professional responsibility. The master-servant relationship that Rumsfeld has established with his officers—and which his officers have too obsequiously accepted—is a terrible thing for morale; it sets an intimidating example to career officers of lower rank; and, most of all, it’s bad for national security. A defense secretary shouldn’t feel he has to take an officer’s advice—quite often, he shouldn’t—but he should at least hear it in unvarnished form. If Gates’ tenure is to be a period of restoration, one of the most useful things he could do is to persuade senior officers that they can speak their minds again without fear of demotion or reprisal.
I’m, of course, of the opinion that we need more soldiers in the military and Iraq, and that our goal should be the beginning of withdrawal next year, late next year, and I’m glad that Kaplan and I share some points, although I do believe that we should accompany our increase in troops with messages to the Iraqis saying, “We’re about to go.”
Now, I must say that I’m not enamored with Speaker Pelosi or Congressman Murtha (though I do love Harry Reid, Chuck Schumer and Rahm Emmanuel), and I’m not particularly enamored with the race for House Leadership, but I’ve got to reply to this. Some have criticized Jack Murtha’s ethics, and he refers to the criticism as “Swift Boating.” Sorry sir, but when your lobbyist brother makes money off of bills you passed, you don’t have a right to say, “I’m a soldier, don’t criticize me!” in response. This isn’t the Army, and the Democratic Party isn’t your private, Jack.
I’m rooting for his opponent for Majority Leader, Steny Hoyer, and not merely by default although Murtha’s loud mouth and crooked ethics does play a part.